“If the goal of a peace process is only to end violence, then women — who are rarely the belligerents — are unlikely to be considered legitimate participants. If the goal is to build peace, however, it makes sense to gain more diverse inputs from the rest of society.”

**HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE RESOLUTIONS**

**Resolution 1325**

Urges Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict.

**Resolution 1820**

Urges the Secretary-General and his Special Envoys to invite women to participate in discussions pertinent to the prevention and resolution of conflict, the maintenance of peace and security, and post-conflict peacebuilding.

**Resolution 1889**

Urges Member States, international and regional organisations to take further measures to improve women's participation during all stages of peace processes [...] including by enhancing their engagement in political and economic decision-making at early stages of recovery processes, through [...] promoting women’s leadership and capacity to engage in aid management and planning, supporting women’s organizations, and countering negative societal attitudes about women’s capacity to participate equally.
Resolution 2122

Requests the Secretary-General and his Special Envoys and Special Representatives to United Nations missions, as part of their regular briefings, to update the Council on progress in inviting women to participate, including through consultations with civil society, including women’s organizations, in discussions pertinent to the prevention and resolution of conflict, the maintenance of peace and security and post-conflict peacebuilding.

Resolution 2122

Further expresses its intention to include provisions to facilitate women’s full participation and protection in: election preparation and political processes, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs, security sector and judicial reforms, and wider post-conflict reconstruction processes where these are mandated tasks within the mission.
Women have always participated in peace negotiations and peacebuilding, but always at the informal level and rarely visible to the formal peacemakers and keepers of peace. Women have surrounded buildings to make leaders stay in the room, such as in Liberia; they have elected themselves as a third force, such as in Northern Ireland; they have demanded that justice be part of any peace process, such as the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo; they have rallied the country with calls for peace, like the Women in Black in Serbia. Despite their heartfelt efforts, statistics collected by international organizations, focusing on formal processes, record only a small percentage of women, if any, involved in peacemaking. As a result, a great deal of effort and programming at the international level has gone into including women in formal peace processes and in the formal politics of the country concerned.

At a technical level, this has meant that a great deal of donor money has been poured into women's programmes that attempt to develop political leadership for women in formal processes. This is important, and there must be a sustained effort to increase their numbers, because research shows that this has an important impact. However, we must also look at ‘politics’ and ‘peacemaking’ differently—not only as a set of actors around a negotiation table, but as a comprehensive process within a society that is inclusive, diverse, and reflective of the interests of the whole society. The present programmes put forward by the international community tend to be extremely narrow: just to bring a female body to the table with some technical expertise.

Most of the data that is collected and circulated widely is about this number. As seen below, though this does have a direct impact, there must be a collective commitment and a qualitative change in the understanding of ‘inclusive’ politics in the context of conflict situations, especially by institutions such as the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations at the UN and their counterparts in Member States. Over the last few years, there have been many positive changes within these institutions but a great deal remains to be done. Strengthening their gender capacity is one way to move forward.

New empirical data is making it harder for the skeptics to doubt the positive impact of women’s leadership and participation in peace processes. This chapter presents a growing body of research that connects the inclusion of women in peace processes—including national dialogues and post-conflict implementation of peace accords—with more durable and stable peace. It also highlights both good practice and implementation gaps, and proposes comprehensive recommendations on the way forward.

**INCLUDING WOMEN IN PEACE PROCESSES**

The best-known and most celebrated diplomatic agreement to be settled in 2015 was not to put an end to a war, but to prevent one. After many years of failed negotiations and decades of enmity, the Republic of Iran and a group of countries formed by the United States, Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany reached a historic deal to curb Iran’s nuclear programme. One important feature of this diplomatic breakthrough was the prominent leadership of three women, Federica Mogherini and Helga Schmid on the European side and Wendy Sherman for the United States. They built on the previous work of another woman, Catherine Ashton, the EU’s chief diplomat until late 2014. They were all credited by their colleagues on the Western side for leading the negotiations and ensuring a deal was reached. Yet, this is a decidedly uncommon sight.

Many actors involved in mediation and conflict resolution remain resistant to including women, claiming a lack of evidence about the positive impact of women’s participation. They are wary of overloading or derailing the process, and assert that their performance as mediators is not based on inclusiveness, but on effectiveness.

**This definition of ‘effective’ is erroneous.**

More than half of peace processes that reach an outcome lapse back into conflict within the first five years. Women activists rightly point to a history
Women activists rightly point to a history of peacemaking littered with examples of failed mediation attempts and broken peace agreements that prove that traditional models cannot be justified by existing assumptions about what works and what does not.

The issue of ‘effectiveness,’ of ‘what works’ is, at the same time, core to the justifications for the inclusion of women. The advocacy behind resolution 1325 rests on the argument that under the equality provisions of human rights documents, including CEDAW, women have the right to full and equal representation. This is buttressed by recent research that provides concrete evidence that women’s participation is linked to better outcomes in general, and that the inclusiveness of peace processes and the democratization of conflict resolution are crucial to sustained peace and stability. Despite this continuing to be openly or implicitly questioned and doubted, the body of empirical research illustrating the positive role of women’s participation only continues to grow.

The positive effects of women’s inclusion

Based on research undertaken by the Graduate Institute in Geneva from 2011 to 2015, an in-depth analysis of 40 peace processes since the end of the Cold War, academics have shown that in cases where women’s groups were able to exercise a strong influence on the negotiation process, there was a much higher chance that an agreement would be reached than when women’s groups exercised weak or no influence. In fact, in cases of women’s participation and strong influence, an agreement was almost always reached. Furthermore, strong influence of women in negotiation processes also positively correlated with a greater likelihood of agreements being implemented. When analyzing commissions set up after the peace agreement to implement major aspects—from drafting and adopting a new constitution, to monitoring disarmament or a ceasefire, to setting up a truth and reconciliation commission—the research found that the more specifically an inclusive composition of these commissions is written into the agreement, the more effective they have been in practice.

Despite claims of the risk of overburdening processes through women’s inclusion, in these 40 case studies, there was not a single case where organized women’s groups had a negative impact on a peace process, an observation that does not hold true for other social actors. Quite the contrary, one of the most repeated effects of women’s involvement in peace processes was pushing for the commencement, resumption, or finalization of negotiations when the momentum had stalled or the talks had faltered.

This finding is complemented by recent statistical analysis based on a dataset of 181 peace agreements signed between 1989 and 2011. When controlling for other variables, peace processes that included women as witnesses, signatories, mediators, and/or negotiators demonstrated a 20 per cent increase in the probability of a peace agreement lasting at least two years. This percentage increases over time, with a 35 per cent increase in the probability of a peace agreement lasting at least two years.
Chapter 3. Women’s Participation

A clear correlation has been established between more open models of negotiations and a higher likelihood that the outcome agreements will hold and prevent a relapse into conflict. Specifically, peace agreements are 64 per cent less likely to fail when civil society representatives participate. This builds on previous quantitative studies on the link between the inclusiveness of peace processes and the quality and sustainability of peace agreements. A lasting 15 years. This builds on previous quantitative studies on the link between the inclusiveness of peace processes and the quality and sustainability of peace agreements. A clear correlation has been established between more open models of negotiations and a higher likelihood that the outcome agreements will hold and prevent a relapse into conflict. Specifically, peace agreements are 64 per cent less likely to fail when civil society representatives participate.

Past analysis of gendered peace processes has focused on what women bring to the table with regards to addressing women’s rights or social issues. What has been less examined is what else women bring to the table—namely, a shift in dynamics. Increasingly, research is showing that the impact on effectiveness is a result of women bringing a particular quality of consensus building to public debate, not necessarily on issues, but on the need to conclude talks and implement agreements. This goal of consensus building is of particular value to peace talks. It underscores the fact that it is important to recognize that women’s participation must not mean that they are solely responsible for women’s issues. Instead, they should be allowed to participate and be decision makers on the full range of issues involved in the peace process.

The other shift women precipitate relates to the deepened peace dividend and its impact on post-conflict peacebuilding. We know that when women are placed at the center of security, justice, economic recovery, and good governance, they will be more direct recipients of a range of peace dividends including job creation and public services. This means that the pay-offs of peace will be delivered more rapidly to communities. For example, without livelihoods and economic empowerment, as the percentage of female-headed households surges during and after conflict, women and girls are forced into low-reward, high-risk work like survival sex, slowing community recovery and normalization, and deepening the poverty and resentment of children. With access to income generation and economic security as a result of just peace agreement outcomes, however, women tend to be quicker to invest in child welfare and education, to build food security, and to rebuild rural economies, greatly contributing to longer term stability (see Chapter 7: Building Peaceful Societies).

In short, women’s inclusion at the peace table shifts the dynamics towards conclusion of talks and implementation of agreements, and centralizes a gendered and inclusive perspective on issues of
In March 2014, the Philippines government and the Moro Islamic Liberation front (MILF) signed a comprehensive peace agreement ending 17 years of negotiations. The peace agreement paves the way for the creation of a new autonomous political entity called ‘Bangsamoro’ in the southern Philippines.

The peace agreement had strong provisions on women’s rights: eight out of its 16 articles mention mechanisms to engage women in governance and development, or protect against violence. This was the direct result of women’s participation in the negotiations, built on a long history of women’s leadership at local and national levels over the years, including under the leadership of two female presidents—Corazón Aquino and later Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, who were both instrumental in re-starting negotiations with the rebel group.

The important shift came in 2001, when for the first time, two women were appointed to the five-member government panel. Since then every negotiating panel appointed by the government has included at least one woman. By the time of the signing of the Comprehensive Agreement in 2014, one third of the people at the table were women. Other government bodies supporting the process (the presidential advisor, secretariat, legal panel, technical working groups) were also headed or composed mostly of women. In December 2012, Miriam Coronel-Ferrer became the first female to chair the government panel. All the women were selected because of their past work for peace in Mindanao, their expertise on negotiation and technical issues, and their representation of significant constituencies through their work in the women’s movement. They demanded that the talks include extensive outreach efforts and public participation, including a national dialogue in 2010 that culminated in a final report that became the basis for discussions and was credited with supporting solutions to thorny issues at the negotiation table. Women were also close to one-third of the members of the transition commission tasked with drafting the Bangsamoro Basic Law, which is the equivalent of a constitutional document for this new political entity.

At the same time, women’s civil society groups supported the process through mass action to prevent derailment by spoilers. For example, following the 2012 Framework Agreement, three weeks of violence broke out between the rebel group and the military, and women led peaceful protests to pressure both sides to end the violence and maintain the momentum of the talks.

Women’s influence in the negotiations has led to a range of clauses and provisions that directly impact their empowerment and rights in the new political entity. The MILF initially opposed women’s participation in negotiations, but ended up appointing a woman to represent their side, and have put an end to their pronouncements against women in public roles. The proposed autonomous political entity must set aside at least five per cent from the official development funds it receives specifically for programmes targeted at women. A consultation mechanism for women is to be established, and women are to be included in the Bangsamoro council of leaders, and among provincial governors, mayors, and indigenous representatives. Special economic programmes will be established for decommissioned female forces of the MILF. The draft Bangsamoro Basic Law requires the future Bangsamoro parliament to enact a law recognizing the important role of women in statebuilding and development, and take steps to ensure their representation, including in parliament. The government has announced the construction of six women and peace training centers in the proposed Bangsamoro territory.
governance, justice, security, and recovery aspects of a peace agreement. These concerns, if addressed, can help build a more robust and sustainable peace, a more rapid return to the rule of law, and increased trust in the new State. Women’s participation also broadens the peace process to larger constituencies beyond the fighting parties and potential spoilers. International and national peacebuilding actors have recognized that social exclusion can be a major driver of conflict, and that inclusiveness broadens the number of stakeholders with an investment in the system of governance, which can deepen stability. This is especially relevant with regards to women’s inclusion. Women’s participation aids in ensuring broader social acceptance and commitment to the peace deal from communities and those affected by the conflict, who will equally be affected by the rebuilding of a new society.

SIGNS OF PROGRESS IN INCLUSIVE PEACEMAKING, BUT A LONG WAY TO GO

In 2010, during the tenth anniversary commemoration of the adoption of resolution 1325, the alarming lack of progress on women’s inclusion—arguably one of the most emblematic of the whole agenda—was highlighted. Member States and regional and international organizations committed to stronger action. Five years later, there have been some notable improvements.

First, there has been an appreciable rise in the number of references to women in the text of peace agreements. Out of 1,168 peace agreements signed between January 1990 and January 2014, only 18 per cent make any references to women or gender. But if one looks at before and after the adoption of resolution 1325, the difference is notable. Prior to 2000, only 11 per cent carried such a reference. Post-2000, this percentage has increased to 27 per cent. While this is still a low percentage, the trend nevertheless is encouraging. As monitored by the UN Department of Political Affairs using the global indicators on implementation of 1325, 50 per cent of peace agreements signed in 2014 included references relevant to women, peace and security, up from 22 per cent in 2010.

Second, these textual references are more likely to be found in agreements where the United Nations was involved. Since resolution 1325, 38 per cent of all agreements mention women or gender equality when the UN has been party to the negotiations. This number has risen significantly in the last five years. Of the six agreements emerging from negotiations or

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<th>Year</th>
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Percentage of peace agreements including at least a reference to women (1990 to Oct 2000 and Nov 2000 to 2015)
national dialogues supported by the UN in 2014, four (67 per cent) contained references relevant to women, peace and security.\textsuperscript{25}

Third, these references are gradually becoming less tokenistic. They have moved from general references to equality towards firmer commitments to women’s participation in various decision-making bodies, security arrangements, and to specific actions affecting women such as addressing violence against women and girls.\textsuperscript{26} For example, the presence of text that registers conflict-related sexual violence as a prohibited act in UN-supported ceasefire agreements tripled from 2010 to 2014.\textsuperscript{27} In Burundi, women succeeded in including provisions on freedom of marriage and the right to choose one’s partner into the peace agreement. In Guatemala, women’s organizations coordinated with the woman representative at the table to introduce commitments to classify sexual harassment as a new criminal offence and establish an office for indigenous women’s rights.\textsuperscript{28} Further, legislative quotas for women are mentioned in 80 per cent of all power-sharing agreements.\textsuperscript{29} Conversely, in the few cases where neither the peace agreement nor the subsequent electoral framework provided for quotas for women’s participation in politics, the numbers of women represented in the legislature were unusually low and in the single digits.

Fourth, it has become a more routine practice both to include gender expertise in mediation support teams, and to consult with women’s organizations. According to DPA’s monitoring, gender expertise was provided by the UN to 88 per cent of relevant processes in 2013 but only 67 per cent in 2014.\textsuperscript{30} This is nevertheless a significant improvement from 36 per cent in 2011. Similarly, 88 per cent of all peace processes with UN engagement in 2014 included regular consultations with women’s organizations, a notable rise from 50 per cent in 2011.\textsuperscript{31} However, consultations for this Study and DPA’s internal assessments have both noted that these meetings are sometimes symbolic affairs—lacking thorough preparation, representativeness, and follow-up.\textsuperscript{32} Although gender expertise is systematically offered through the UN Standby Team of Mediation Experts and roster of senior technical experts, the overall demand from negotiating parties for these skills remains significantly lower than for other areas of mediation standby expertise. In addition, even when gender experts participate, they are not always part of the strategic planning teams and at times restricted to discussions regarding track II processes. A more detailed analysis of conditions that can make these engagements effective is provided below.

Fifth, the overall participation of women in peace processes is inching upwards, albeit at far too slow a rate. In 2012, a study by UN Women indicated that out of a representative sample of 31 major peace processes between 1992 and 2011, only two per cent of chief mediators, four per cent of witnesses and signatories, and nine per cent of negotiators were women.\textsuperscript{33} A 2008 study that scanned 33 peace negotiations had found that only 4 per cent of participants were women.\textsuperscript{34} In 2014, women in senior positions were found in 75 per cent of peace processes led or co-led by the UN, compared with only 36 per cent in 2011.\textsuperscript{35} In recent years, peace talks to resolve conflicts in Colombia and the Philippines in particular have seen a significantly greater participation of women as delegates or signatories in the formal processes.

Procedures for selection for participation can be determined by the mediator, the parties, or agreed formally by a wider set of actors.\textsuperscript{36} Such procedures have included invitations, nominations, elections, open-access participation (typical for most public consultations), and through public advertisement of positions within key implementation commissions. The more successful selection processes in terms of inclusivity are transparent, and carried out by constituents in conjunction with quotas or other temporary special measures for women. When selection is driven entirely by belligerents, women’s capacity to influence the talks, especially with regards to representing gender equality concerns, is likely to be reduced.

It is important to note that an improvement simply in numbers does not necessarily mean that women are able to effectively influence negotiations and shape their implementation. The indicators mentioned, important as they are to highlight progress, often mask a reality that still excludes women from decision-making and limits their engagement to tokenistic or symbolic gestures. As the evidence highlights, the benefits of women’s participation are only fully realized when there is quality participation and the opportunity for influence.\textsuperscript{37}
When peace talks between the government and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) collapsed in early 2002, many women’s organizations continued to insist on the need to find political solutions, and to prepare the ground once again for future negotiations. In the absence of formal talks and despite massive public disenchantment with peace processes, women organized national marches to keep their demands for peace in the public eye. They also worked quietly in the regions to address the rising violence: mediating conflicts in their communities; holding direct dialogues with armed groups to release hostages, prevent violence and displacement; recovering children recruited by the armed actors; and lifting road blockades to secure the passage of food, medicines, and people.

When new rounds of peace talks were launched in Norway in late 2012, all of those seated at the table, with the exception of one Norwegian moderator, were men. In the formal talks, all of the plenipotentiaries and all but one of the up to thirty negotiators on both sides were also men. However, a year later, women’s mobilization and relentless advocacy, combined with international support, resulted in women making up approximately one-third of the delegates of each side of the ongoing peace talks in Havana, Cuba. Further, at least half of participants in all public consultations about the peace talks were women, and a sub-committee on gender has been established to ensure that a gender perspective is incorporated into the peace process, and that the views of women are included in the negotiations. Many women now hold leadership positions and key technical advisory positions in the government institution leading the negotiations, the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace. Members of the delegations and facilitators have received both technical information about the gender dimensions of each item on the agenda of the talks, as well as powerfully moving visits by multiple delegations of victims from all sides of the conflict, a majority of whom are women.

UN Women and the UN country team under the leadership of the Resident Coordinator in Colombia have supported women’s participation in all these aspects—from the public consultations, to the victims’ visits to Havana, to the participation of the delegates themselves. Also included was a landmark National Women’s Summit for Peace, which brought together approximately 450 representatives of Colombian women’s organizations in Bogotá in late October 2013. At the time of this writing, despite the many challenges and deep divisions in Colombian society, this represents the most promising round of negotiations to end one of the longest-lasting armed conflicts in the world.
THE PERSISTENCE OF BARRIERS TO WOMEN’S FULL PARTICIPATION

“It is not enough to acknowledge the right of women to participate in peace processes. Mediators and negotiators, and donor governments must address the very real obstacles to women’s physical presence at the negotiation table and at any behind-the-scenes or after-hours negotiations. For example, in practice, many women in such situations are not members of the warring parties coming to the table, and will not have access to the resources made available to those parties. Women may also have family obligations that men do not have. In order then to participate on an equal footing with men, women may need support for childcare, transportation, accommodation, and personal security.”


In recent years, despite the yearly recitation of the obligations that emanate from resolution 1325, and a few positive case studies highlighted in this chapter, the poor levels of representation of women in formal conflict resolution processes persist. Whether in peace talks about South Sudan, Mali, or Myanmar, women continue to be excluded or marginalized, and where they do participate their influence is often hampered through low numbers and process design. The failure to prioritize inclusion, and as a result sustainable peace, lies within an overall approach to negotiations, which if to be redressed requires a rethinking of overall objectives and pathways to peace. Conflict prevention and resolution, as practiced today, continues to focus on neutralizing potential spoilers and perpetrators of violence, rather than investing in resources for peace.

The intention behind resolution 1325 was precisely to enrich the methods of peacebuilding through the inclusion of a neglected category of peacemakers and social rebuilders. It is an attempt to illuminate the often invisible, informal, and unrecognized role that women and girls play in conflict prevention and resolution, from peace activism to day-to-day intra-family and inter-community mediation and reconciliation. It is also an attempt to seize the opportunity and empower women at the moment when crises and transitions have thrust them into new, unconventional roles; and to bring the benefits of inclusiveness, representativeness, and diversity to settings and processes that are almost exclusively male-dominated.

In tandem with positive signs and clear proof of the impact of women’s participation in peace processes, the research also found the existence of more worrisome trends. For example, across the 40 case studies examined in the Graduate Institute of Geneva/Inclusive Peace and Transition Initiative’s Broadening Participation Project, women’s inclusion was often contested, rarely a natural and unforced element of proceedings, and mostly initiated and achieved via concerted pressure and lobbying by women’s organizations within the country, rather than by the conflict parties, the mediators, or the organizers of the negotiations.

There are numerous examples where conflict parties took steps to include political parties or specific civil society organizations—to either gain legitimacy or add actors to the table that were perceived favorable to their agenda—but hardly ever did parties take steps to include women’s organizations in the peace process. Support for women’s participation typically came as a result of intense lobbying by the local women’s movement and international actors, and was almost never proposed by the mediation team or the conflict parties.

The intention behind resolution 1325 was precisely to enrich the methods of peacebuilding through the inclusion of a neglected category of peacemakers and social rebuilders.
Even when women participate in significant numbers, they are not always able to influence the proceedings and outcomes. This can sometimes be the result of division among women over key issues or lack of a collective voice, but often, it is because a small group of male leaders makes all the important decisions, even if the process has been opened up to include women’s groups. For example, the 2011 Oslo Joint Statement between the government of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front (NDF)—the longest running communist insurgency in Asia—had approximately one-third female representation around the table. However, many of the women selected by the NDF were the wives of the organization’s leaders, who had limited legitimacy and influence over the majority of NDF members and their operations in the Philippines. Since then, the talks remain on hold. In the 2001 Somali peace process, women were allocated a quota in all six reconciliation committees, but any decision required the authorization of a leadership committee of male clan elders. In 15 of the 16 national dialogues examined for this Study, it was found that decision-making was left to a small group of male leaders.

Women’s participation also tends, consistently, to be limited within a timeframe, rather than sustained from the preparatory phases of peace talks or political transitions, right through to follow-up and implementation. This is true for national dialogues too. While international norms, pressure, and support are increasingly used to ensure that women are included during transitions, women are rarely included in the preparation phase, and typically receive insufficient support thereafter to implement the gains achieved. What is lacking are more (or any) cases in which women’s participation was an integral component of the design of the peace process from the beginning to the end, as asked for by resolution 1325 and other global norms. In Guatemala, the 1996 peace accords included robust provisions on gender equality, resulting from the direct participation of women in the peace process. And yet, even though women’s organizations continued their advocacy after the agreement, and they had two reserved seats in the National Council for the Implementation of the Peace Accords, their efforts were mostly effaced by the lack of political will, the weakness of implementation mechanisms, the expansion of...
“[P]eace processes that included women as witnesses, signatories, mediators, and/or negotiators demonstrated a 20% increase in the probability of a peace agreement lasting at least two years. This increases over time, with a 35% increase in the probability of a peace agreement lasting 15 years.”

Laurel Stone, “Quantitative Analysis of Women’s Participation in Peace Processes”
Chapter 3. Women’s Participation

During the Kenyan-led 2001-2005 Somali peace process, an ostensibly significant role was afforded to women. A key element of the process was the operation of six ‘reconciliation’ committees tasked with identifying and presenting recommendations on key causes of conflict. Although quotas ensured women were represented in all six committees, their actual impact on the peace process and its overall quality was limited. All decisions arrived at by the committees required the authorization of a leadership committee dominated by male clan leaders. The existence of this leadership committee and the decision-making dynamics in place meant that the role of the reconciliation committees, and the women in them, was effectively muted.

In Nepal, women’s participation in the Constituent Assembly (CA) was given a boost by the adoption of a quota system, which led to a total of 197 female CA members out of 601. Women comprised almost 33 per cent of the total CA. They were also represented in a number of the CA’s thematic committees. However, the increased representation did not have a commensurate impact on their influence. On the one hand, there was and continues to be huge resistance among major political parties (mainly male political actors) to challenging inequality, discussing women’s issues and gender-sensitivity. On the other hand, the female political actors are divided over key issues and seriously lack a collective voice, which is affecting progress on women’s issues. In an effort to improve their advocacy for women’s issues and to develop a common agenda, female CA members formed a women’s caucus. This failed however, because ultimately, party loyalties proved to be more important. These dynamics limit women’s impact despite their large numbers—and despite an advantageous quota system—and illustrate again that when women are unable to speak with one voice on crucial issues (such as the maternal citizenship issue) and lack a common goal, the result is weak overall influence.

By contrast, in Northern Ireland during the negotiations for the Good Friday Agreement (1998) the top ten political parties represented at the negotiation table had no female representation at all. That was the trigger for a few committed women to form a separate women’s political party (the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition NIWC), which eventually won support and was given a seat next to the other parties at the negotiation table. Although the NIWC was outnumbered by male-dominated parties, their decision-making power was enhanced because they were negotiating on the same level as the other political parties, and they were able to push for the inclusion of many issues, which ultimately made it into the final agreement. The NIWC pushed for equality, human rights and broad inclusion. They promoted an inclusive, cooperative process, and put women’s participation and women’s rights on the top of the political agenda. The NIWC also focused on preventative measures against violence, and on prosecutions of cases on violence against women.

FOCUS ON

Quantity versus quality of women’s involvement – The importance of influence

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transnational companies engaged in extractive industries, the significant growth of organized crime (mainly drug trafficking), and the resulting insecurity and militarization.\textsuperscript{48}

Finally, the logistical barriers to participation that women face cannot be ignored. For example, they may need to organize childcare, they may lack funds to travel, or they may require security to attend meetings. Support centers are one way of strengthening the participation of women’s groups during negotiations. For example, during the 2001-2005 Somali peace negotiations, women benefitted from a number of support structures sponsored by international organizations. Key among these was a resource center, fully equipped with computers, photocopiers, printers, and internet access. As one of the few locations with adequate communications equipment during the negotiation proceedings, the center provided women’s groups with direct lobbying access to influential figures who were forced to use their equipment.\textsuperscript{49}

**Emerging good practice in women’s engagement for peace**

In recent years, a standard of gender-responsive peace processes has begun to take shape. Mediation actors know—or should know—that technical gender expertise should always be available to the negotiating parties and as part of the mediation support teams; that women’s organizations need to be regularly consulted from the outset and all the way through the implementation phase; that the agenda and outcome documents should explicitly address women’s needs and priorities; and that the significant representation of women should be provided for at the peace table and in the institutions responsible to implement any agreement. Many actors involved in peace processes may be supportive of greater gender equality, but would like more information and guidance about the specific modalities to achieve this in the actual management of a peace process.\textsuperscript{50}

The role of the mediator is one of the most important factors in determining the quality of women’s participation in peace talks. This is the role played by Robinson in the Great Lakes and Machel in Kenya, or Mandela in Burundi, Arnaud in Guatemala, and Benomar in Yemen, among others.\textsuperscript{51} The engagement of women in Yemen’s (2013-14) National Dialogue offers an example of what can be achieved even in one of the least propitious circumstances for women’s political empowerment. It illustrates how the design of the rules and structures of a political dialogue, and the influence of the mediator’s role, can determine the extent to which women’s voices are heard. **Yemen is also a striking example of the importance of senior leadership and political will.** Whatever the subsequent developments, the achievement of women’s inclusion in the national dialogue process despite great contextual constraints stands in stark contrast to the peace talks being embarked on in Syria at the same time. Despite Syria’s longer history of women’s empowerment and greater number of educated women, the justification of ‘cultural resistance’ was used far too easily.\textsuperscript{52} While no two situations are comparable,\textsuperscript{53} and each context demands its own set of uniquely designed responses, in a shifting global political context where the UN’s relevance is increasingly questioned, a consistent commitment to universal norms and standards is an important contributor to legitimacy.

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In the IGAD-led talks in Addis Ababa, after more than 10 rounds of negotiations and at least 7 broken ceasefires over a year and a half, women had only token representation at the table. Though they were allocated some seats, the selection process was co-opted by the warring parties. Nevertheless, the peace agreement signed in August 2015 revealed efforts to take into account both the participation of women in the peace and political processes, women’s specific needs in and after the conflict, including transitional justice, accountability, healing and reconciliation, as well as their economic empowerment. However, gender-specific programming language, in areas such as humanitarian aid, security sector reform and DDR, remained insufficient. In addition, the text adopted did not define a clear role for women or civil society in monitoring the ceasefire and the implementation of the peace agreement. It also did not address crucial matters about the return of IDPs, prisoners of war, and child soldiers.

The ten-month National Dialogue Conference (NDC) in Yemen in 2013 offers several important lessons. One is that stark gender inequality and cultural objections to women’s empowerment can be overcome by good design and sustained pressure by the local women’s movement and international actors.

In 2013, the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Index ranked Yemen’s disparities the worst in the world in education, health, and economic and political life. And yet, in response to Yemeni women’s demands, and building on their role during the revolution, the UN Special Advisor on Yemen at the time, Jamal Benomar, was able to create conditions for women’s voice in conflict resolution. With the support of UN entities like UN Women and UNFPA, and international NGOs like Oxfam, NDI, the Berghof Foundation, and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, the following innovations were achieved:

- The National Dialogue’s Preparatory Committee consisted of 19 per cent women. After much lobbying from women’s groups and the Special Advisor, the committee ultimately agreed on a 30 per cent quota for women.

- In addition to this quota for women across all constituencies, women had their own delegation of 40 seats. The Preparatory Committee agreed on a three-part quota for NDC participants: 50 per cent from Southern Yemen, 20 per cent youth, and 30 per cent women. This quota applied across all groups represented so that, for instance, youth needed to include 30 per cent women, and women needed to include 20 per cent youth. The ‘package’ quota that tied the percentage of women and youth to that of Southern groups may have helped prevent it from unraveling in later discussions.
• Most constituencies included women as part of their delegation as required, but the Salafis left seats in their delegation empty rather than include women. Overall, 28 per cent of participants were women (161 out of 565). Each constituency selected their own representatives, including the women, but both the independent bloc of women and the presidential appointees were selected via an open application process.

• Conference resolutions were drafted by thematic working groups. Each working group was led by a chairperson, two vice-chairpersons, and a rapporteur. In each working group, at least one of these leadership positions was filled by a woman. Three out of nine working groups were chaired by women. The consensus committee, which helped resolve issues that working groups could not agree on, consisted of 25 per cent women.

• Resolutions at the working group and conference level required 90 per cent approval to be adopted (going down to 75 per cent in second round voting), making it impossible to pass resolutions over the objections of the majority of women in the conference.

• All participants were asked to make a televised two-minute presentation at the start of the conference, which ensured that everyone had at least one opportunity to be heard. Additionally, before the National Dialogue started, USAID sponsored a national women’s conference.

• A focal point for women and a focal point for youth were recruited within the Special Advisor’s team and a consultant hired to support women’s civil society and political groups on engaging in Yemen’s transition. These groups provided technical inputs on issues that would affect women’s equity in the final constitution, including electoral systems and quotas, transitional justice, and constitutional provisions on gender equity.

• The Office of the Special Advisor set up a meeting space—the Women’s Dialogue Forum—where women representatives could meet amongst themselves and with local NGOs. Members of this Forum reviewed the outputs from each working group with the support of gender specialists, shared proposed amendments with all participants, consulted with NGOs, and compiled recommendations for each of the working groups. These meetings took place about once a week. Members of the Forum also held a number of meetings with NGOs at the governorate level. The UN team was careful to avoid meeting times that would prevent women from attending if they had traditional obligations in the home such as preparing meals or looking after children.

Many issues related to gender equality arose during the NDC, including the age of marriage (18 years), a 30 per cent quota in parliament, the right to education, paid maternity leave, criminalization of violence against women and sex trafficking, and the right to work. Women who participated in the NDC reportedly experienced substantial empowerment through networking, developing new political skills, and learning to lobby, including the ability to speak out in the company of men, which many had never done before. The NDC recommendations were submitted to the Constitutional Drafting Committee, where women were represented in the same proportion as in the National Dialogue. Although suspended due to the deterioration of the security situation, the National Dialogue outcome document and draft constitution are understood as the foundation for the future in Yemen.
DRAWING ON TRACK 2 PROCESSES AND WOMEN’S ACTIVISM

“Women are not absent because they lack negotiating skills or because they cannot make vital contributions to peace processes. In Colombia, women’s groups have united to create Women for Peace, a new movement offering concrete recommendations and proposals for the nascent peace process. Malian women, [...] have been active for months over the crisis in Mali, asserting their right to engage in the efforts to bring about a political solution to the crisis, and reminding all actors that women have been specifically targeted in the violence, especially in northern Mali.”

Bineta Diop, Founder and President of Femmes Africa Solidarité, Security Council Open Debate on women, peace and security, 2012

By focusing only on formal, national level processes, the international community literally shapes or constructs what is seen as relevant and decisive in peace processes, without sufficiently recognizing that investment at the local and sub-national level—or track 2—where many women are already brokering peace or shoring up the resilience of communities against the spread of conflict, is just as important and may be neglected. Increasing women’s participation in peace processes requires shifting the parameters of what we consider ‘political.’ For the UN this entails first, broadening the process beyond the political and military elite that is often male, and second, adjusting hierarchical conceptions of track 1 and track 2 peace processes.

What counts as adequate engagement of women on the ground, or significant participation of women in peace processes? While there are many examples of women’s roles in peace processes over the last two decades, these are typically not standard modes of engagement that would ensure a minimum level of women’s inclusion. For many of them, women have had to overcome great barriers to participation. They have neither enjoyed open doors nor standard modes of engagement that would ensure a minimum level of women’s inclusion. There is no shortage of stories of exceptional women making a difference by their sheer courage and tenacity, as has been detailed above.

The narrow focus on national and international formal peace processes, which often stumble or stall, prevents full consideration from being given to the multiple actors often busy with track 2 processes, such as building peace and security ceasefires in conflict-affected communities.

These sub-national and local mediation initiatives, where women usually have a very prominent role, receive wholly inadequate recognition and support. In Syria, women negotiate cessations of hostilities and humanitarian access at the local level, but they have until recently remained largely marginalized from the formal attempts to address the crisis in their country, In spite of engaging in advocacy at the highest political level both with the UN-Arab League mediator and the UN Security Council. In South Sudan, women continue to mobilize for peace and promote dialogue between the factions, as well as in relation to the
tensions with Sudan, in spite of high personal cost, and yet their ability to influence the formal process meaningfully remains elusive.

In Colombia, as in South Sudan, women’s participation and leadership in community peace processes have proved essential to sustaining track 1 processes. Broadening the political therefore calls for an expansion of the notion of ‘peace process’ to include community and track 2 initiatives. Importantly, in this context, in its political work, the UN must ensure that its engagement with regard to women’s participation represents the diversity of women in the country concerned; and that political and societal factors that have the potential to either hinder or facilitate women’s inclusion in peace processes are adequately considered, such as public and elite support, and the power of regional actors.

**FOCUS ON**

**Women for peace and dialogue in Burundi**

In Burundi, recent political and electoral conflicts have led to confrontations between security forces and protesters, and at times, imprisonment of protestors and civilians, significant displacement of populations and growing tension and conflicts throughout the country. This is compounded by a lack of reliable information that has the effect of inflaming tensions.

Burundian women have historically played an important role as agents of peace, thanks to their ability to initiate mediation and reconciliation processes, to bring conflicting parties together and to re-start peaceful dialogue between various actors. A new nationwide network of women mediators, established by the UN in close partnership with the Ministry of Interior and civil society organizations, has proven effective in preventing violence at the local level, dispelling false rumors, and mitigating the impact of the ongoing political crisis on populations. Through their collaboration with provincial and local authorities, this network of women mediators has shared relevant information, including early warning, and encouraged the organization of local consultations to discuss peace and to identify strategies to build community security.

Operating in groups of four mediators in 129 municipalities across the country, the network of women mediators was able to deal with more than 3,000 local conflicts between January and May 2015, the majority of which were increasingly of political and electoral nature. The mediators initiated dialogue between the authorities, security forces, political parties, protesters, CSO and citizens. They limited the negative impact of demonstrations by sensitizing demonstrators on the respect of personal property and the importance of nonviolent behavior. They also advocated for the release of demonstrators and opposition parties’ members. Women mediators further protected families who were accused of fleeing; sought to promote tolerance by initiating dialogue among conflicting parties and advising on the constructive handling of political and electoral conflict; promoted dialogue and understanding among divided groups and communities; and countered rumors and exaggerated fears with verifiable information.
Transmitting women’s voices – the role of external actors

Women have used a range of methods to engage in peace talks: through direct representation at the negotiation table, as observers, as part of official or semi-official consultations, in commissions set up to manage the process or implement the agreements, in specific workshops, as part of public decision-making (for example, elections and referendum), and through mass action. Important details, like the selection procedures for participants or the mechanism by which civil society or external actors can feed ideas to the parties of the negotiation, can have significant bearing on the nature and impact of women’s participation. As mentioned earlier, the role of external actors such as mediators and envoys can be particularly relevant in this regard.

Research has found that the most effective strategies to ‘transfer’ the results of consultations for women or the agreed priorities of women’s organizations, is to combine the ‘insider’ tactics of submitting position papers directly to negotiators and meeting with mediators, negotiators, or technical advisors, with ‘outsider’ tactics like issuing public reports, lobbying international actors, and conducting media outreach.

A very successful ‘transfer’ strategy used by women’s networks and coalitions is the development of a common document expressing a unified position of a cross-section of women’s groups, which can then be handed to mediation and negotiation teams. In Kenya, Machel helped women’s groups negotiate their differences and come up with one joint memorandum to be submitted to the AU panel, and most of its provisions found their way into the agreement. In South Africa, the National Women’s Coalition, after extensive research and discussion, produced the ‘Women’s Charter for Effective Equality,’ which had significant influence on the content of the constitution, law, and policy. This demonstrates again that few factors are more important than then strength of the women’s movement in a given country, and why it is important for the international community to provide them with sustained, long-term support.

One of the most repeated effects of women’s involvement in peace processes was pushing for the commencement, resumption, or finalization of negotiations when the momentum had stalled or the talks had faltered.

In consultations for this Study, partners raised the issue of training for women from civil society—for example in coalition building, strategic communication, stakeholder mapping, partnerships, and mediation. While the evidence points to the enhanced impact and influence as a result of women’s groups preparedness, the general sense was that women do not necessarily lack skills; and that this oft-repeated solution of capacity building as the road to inclusion, is often simply one way of excluding women owing to their lack of capacity and skills.

This is frequently used as a convenient justification for ignoring women’s voices. Rather, what is needed is training and awareness-raising of (mostly-male) gatekeeper, particularly on the importance of women’s engagement.

Political will and political skill are key to integrating and amplifying women’s voices in political dialogue. Political will is applied by parties to political settlements and their supporters when they proactively engage women leaders and women’s organizations in dialogue to resolve conflict—especially when this is perceived as alien to local political practice. Skill is exercised constantly by mediators and political actors when they build political space for compromise and
Increasingly, research is showing that the impact on effectiveness is a result of women bringing a particular quality of consensus building to public debate, not necessarily on issues, but on the need to conclude talks and implement agreements.

reconciliation. This can involve crafting coalitions and supporting the emergence of new political forces that are inclusive and democratic. Often, women’s groups are politically marginalized by dominant local political actors and invisible to external actors, so the skill required to elevate their political importance is considerable, and unfortunately, all too rare.

By making no effort to engage women’s groups, external actors can actually mirror domestic misogyny. Sometimes this is out of a lack of effort to do otherwise, and sometimes it is out of an exaggerated respect for what are perceived to be local mores. This same respect for social norms however, is not extended when it comes to the participation of other groups deemed crucial to successful political dialogue—such as key power-brokers in exile, business leaders, representatives of refugee communities, or representatives of marginalized regions, religions or races. Some of these interest groups may not be welcomed by dominant domestic political interests, but external actors often know their participation is crucial, and use their political skill to ensure their engagement. In the rare cases in which mediators have done this for women, their actions have had the valuable effect of signaling to local interlocutors that women’s participation is considered essential, and this process has raised the perceived political significance and actual impact of the women involved.

Women advocates frequently face a dilemma in trying to engage in peace talks. On the one hand, without a firm policy specifying the time period within which external actors mediating a conflict should meet with women leaders, the types of women’s organizations they should seek out, the frequency of meetings and even the subjects that ought to be addressed, such encounters usually simply do not occur. On the other hand, there is considerable reluctance to tie the hands of mediators or envoys with specific requirements or constraints on the concessions they can make to negotiating parties in exchange for promises to participate in talks or to come to key agreements.

For this reason, practical actions to increase women’s numbers in peace talks or to amplify their voice have never taken the form of hard requirements. Past recommendations therefore have urged mediators ‘where possible’ to do what they can to build women’s engagement in political dialogue. In essence, such recommendations urge mediators to make a good faith effort, with no accountability system to monitor whether any such effort was made, nor whether it went far enough. Stricter or more specific requirements—such as establishing a time-frame within which mediators must consult with representatives of women’s organizations, or requiring such consultations to recur with a specific frequency; or mandating that mediators help negotiate between women’s groups and other political actors to secure influential positions for women in political processes—are generally rejected as overly crude instruments.

While these might be inappropriate to a particular context or process, or they might trigger backlash or work better at a later stage of the process, in the absence of such good faith actions by mediators and envoys after fifteen years of pleas to consult with women, the time has come to propose more specific measures that can be monitored and accounted for.
RECOMMENDATIONS

Moving progress beyond 2015: Proposals for action

The UN should:

✓ Include a specific responsibility drafted into the Terms of Reference of every mediator and envoy, every SRSG and Deputy SRSG, to advance women’s engagement in national decision-making processes, and specifically all aspects of conflict resolution, power-sharing, national dialogue and reconciliation.

✓ Ensure that UN-appointed mediators and special envoys report on their consultations and outreach to women’s groups in line with Security Council resolution 2122 (2013).

Member States, the UN, and the international community should:

✓ Ensure that all actors, mediators, Groups of Friends, and parties to the conflict guarantee that women’s participation in talks is equal and meaningful, and barriers to their participation, whether these exist in law or in practice, are completely eliminated.

✓ Desist from any use of observer status as a substitute for real and effective participation. Women should not be on the sidelines observing, but an integral part of negotiations and decision-making on the future of their country.

✓ Invest in developing tools that examine the gendered impacts of various outcomes of peace talks, whether they be federalism, constitution making, transitional justice, power sharing, or cease fire provisions.

✓ Commit to mediate between women’s organizations and dominant national political leaders to encourage national political actors, including leaders of belligerent parties, to include women in their delegations and to address women’s concerns in their negotiations. Member states in contact groups supporting specific peace processes could offer the negotiating parties various incentives to do this—training, logistical support, or adding delegate seats for example.

✓ Commit to include agenda items on women’s participation in meetings with Groups of Friends and other facilitators of national dialogue, including organizing meetings between representatives of national women’s organizations and the Member States making up Groups of Friends.

✓ For each process, develop and fund a strategy of long-term support to build the capacity of women’s networks to engage in political dialogue, strengthen the gender awareness of mediators, facilitators and conflict parties, address practical issues that may limit women’s engagement—from granular details such as procedures for circulation of agenda and materials to bigger issues like the use of local languages, and protect women activists from potential backlash.

✓ Advocate for and support inclusive and transparent selection criteria for women at negotiations or beyond, including, for example, by ensuring women’s participation in the leadership committees of peace talks, national dialogues, and consultative forums; and creating formal mechanisms to transfer women’s demands to the negotiation table.

✓ Support women’s engagement and participation not just in peace talks, but in preventive
diplomacy and the monitoring and implementation of agreements. This should be extended to both the preparatory and implementation phases of peace processes and political transitions, rather than limited to a given round of negotiations or national dialogue.

**Member States should:**

✓ Increase the number of women in their foreign service and national security establishments, and take steps to ensure that women diplomats are engaged in leadership roles in conflict resolution.

**Mediators and Special Envoys should:**

✓ Assume a specific responsibility to advise all parties to dialogue/peace talks/constitutional reform about the value of temporary special measures to increase the numbers of women on negotiating parties. At the same time, the mediator/envoy's office must advise national women's organizations of the range of temporary special measures available and their effectiveness in other contexts.

✓ Commit to meet with representatives of a cross-section of women's organizations within the first 30 days of any deployment, and to follow this with periodic (at least four times a year), scheduled, and minuted meetings. These meetings should be used not only to hear women's perspectives on conflict resolution, but also to provide women's groups with information about opportunities to engage in upcoming dialogue, donor conferences, and informal and formal peace processes.

✓ Commit to raise, as a matter of course and routine, specific gender issues for inclusion in ceasefires and peace talks, such as the prevention of sexual violence, justice for gender crimes, temporary special measures for women's political engagement, specific gender quotas in the leadership of post-conflict commissions to implement the peace accord, and gender-specific provisions in administrative and economic recovery arrangements (including women's land access and property rights). For example, military power sharing should focus not just on merging armies and command structures, but also putting in place rights protections, civilian and democratic accountability, and ensuring women's representation throughout. Territorial power-sharing should include protection for women's rights and participation at the sub-national level, with attention paid to the relationship between women's rights and local customary and traditional laws.

✓ Commit to include a gender advisor on the mediation team as well as to include women who are experts in political analysis and other areas covered by the team.

✓ Recognize that women's participation does not mean that they are solely responsible for women's issues, but that they are allowed to participate and be decision-makers on the full range of issues involved in the peace process.

✓ Commit to ensure that technical experts on a mediators' team are trained on the gender-related aspects of their technical area, and that these technical experts themselves have the relevant technical knowledge on the impact of women's participation and the skills to support effective inclusion.
REFERENCES


5. Ibid., 4.

6. Remarks made by Sanam Anderlini, Executive Director of the International Civil Society Action Network (ICAN) at the symposium ‘Negotiating a Better Peace: Women and Civil Society at the Table’, organized by UN Women, ICAN, Global Network of Women Peacebuilders (GNWP) and the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), June 2014.

7. For some years the international community has noted the need for transitions to be ‘inclusive enough’ in order to succeed (see, in particular, “World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development” (The World Bank, 2011)). While the norm of inclusion seems to be well-established and prioritized by mediators, the question of who is included is less decided. In practice, women have not been seen as a necessary group for inclusion as they are not traditionally perceived as potential spoilers. See, Sara Hellmüller, Julia Palmiano Federer, and Mathias Zeller, “The Role of Norms in International Peace Mediation” (NOREF Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, 2015).


9. Paffenholz et al., “Making Women Count: Assessing Women's Inclusion and Influence on the Quality and Sustainability of Peace Negotiations and Implementation.” Cross-tabulation shows the degree of women's influence on the negotiation/implementation/outcome of cases. 40 in-depth qualitative negotiation case-studies analyzed, including implementation in period 1999-2013. Participation/inclusion was defined as taking part in an inclusion modality in both official and non-official roles. Negotiation cases include peace, constitution-making and political transition negotiations. Sustainability of agreements refers to the degree to which provisions are addressed in the post agreement phase and conflict-related violence reduced 1 year and 5 years after agreements. Values aggregated on case level, which may obscure women's influence or lack thereof on some inclusion modalities.


13. Ibid.


17. Paffenholz et al., “Making Women Count: Assessing Women’s Inclusion and Influence on the Quality and Sustainability of Peace Negotiations and Implementation.”


23. Bell, “Text and Context: Evaluating Peace Agreements for Their ‘Gender Perspective.’” This is in contrast to 25 per cent when the UN is not a party to negotiations.

24. Bell, “Text and Context: Evaluating Peace Agreements for Their ‘Gender Perspective,” 15 and appendix I. These figures include any reference to ‘gender,’ to ‘women’ or to a type of woman–for example: widow, girl, girl-orphans, mothers, or wives; to a women’s organisation (even just as a signatory to the agreement); to a women’s convention; or to resolution 1325 itself; to gender-violence, or sexual violence, or specific crimes of sexual violence such as ‘rape’; and to sex or gender equality (but not general references to equality where these terms were not specifically mentioned).


26. Bell, “Text and Context: Evaluating Peace Agreements for Their ‘Gender Perspective.”” Out of all the agreements that mention quotas for women, 79 per cent of them were signed after resolution 1325. Similarly, as for specific provisions related to violence against women and girl, 83 per cent of them appear in agreement signed after 1325 was adopted.


31. Ibid., para. 20.


34. Vicenç Fisas, “Anuario 2008 de Procesos de Paz” (Barcelona: Escola de Cultura de Pau, 2008), 20–22.

35. This data is calculated annually by UN Women for the Secretary-General’s report on Women and Peace and Security. See “Secretary-General’s Report on Women and Peace and Security (2015),” 12–13.


38. For a longer history of women’s engagement in the peace process in Colombia, see Bouvier, “Gender and the Role of Women in Colombia’s Peace Process.”

Chapter 3. Women's Participation

40. There are a few exceptions, such as: the Burundi peace process from 1999-2003, the government of the Philippines in negotiations in 2001 and since 2004, the National Democratic Front in the Philippines until 2011, the reconciliation committees of the 2001 Somali peace process, and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in Indonesia in 2005. In addition, the Papua New Guinea-Bougainville Peace Negotiations from 1997-2005, women were one of three main groups at the peace table, and were among the signatories of the 2001 Peace Agreement. Women in Papua New Guinea traditionally played a significant role in dispute resolution. See, O'Reilly, Ó Súilleabháin, and Paffenholz, “Reimagining Peacemaking: Women's Roles in Peace Processes”; Paffenholz et al., “Making Women Count: Assessing Women’s Inclusion and Influence on the Quality and Sustainability of Peace Negotiations and Implementation.”


42. Ibid., 20–21. The government maintains a negotiating panel of five members that includes two women who both have strong affiliations with peace advocacy groups and civil society organizations in the Philippines.

43. Ibid., 29.


45. Research undertaken through an independent study by Kristi Samuels, commissioned by UN Women in 2015 on national dialogues and participatory political transitions.


48. Input provided by Luz Mendez, member of the High-Level Advisory Group for the Global Study.


50. In a recognition of the need for tools to assist on the practicalities of ‘how’ to establish processes that are simultaneously inclusive of civil society and gender sensitive in substance, one civil society organization, ICAN, developed the ‘Better Peace Tool’ – an open source tool on how to be inclusive in all stages of a peace process/mediation. See “Better Peace Initiative,” ICAN, accessed September 10, 2015, http://www.icanpeacework.org/better-peace-initiative/. DPA’s high-level seminar on gender and inclusive mediation processes, supported by the EU, Norway, Finland and in partnership with Crisis Management Initiative and PRI, has been conducted eight times, reaching 168 envoys, mediators, and senior officials. The seminar addresses skills and strategies for more inclusive process design and options for gender-related provisions in agreements, including specific language for key thematic areas.

51. Mary Robinson, the first woman appointed by the UN as a chief mediator, launched the Great Lakes Women’s Platform for the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework, to ensure that women in the region were engaged in the implementation of the agreement. By January 2015, 36 women’s groups had received grants through this platform, with additional grantees to be selected throughout 2015.


53. While one relates to peace talks and the other to a national dialogue process, both are processes for transition and negotiation.


55. Research through an independent study by Kristi Samuels, commissioned by UN Women in 2015 on national dialogues and participatory political transitions.

56. Contracted by UN Women.


58. For example, many of the members of the Taskforce on the Engagement of Women, a cross-border coalition of activists from Sudan and South Sudan, have lost multiple family members in the recent conflict. See, Case, “Without Inclusion, No Hope for Peace in South Sudan.”

59. Information provided to the Global Study by the UN Women Country Office in Burundi.


Sustainability of Peace Negotiations and Implementation;” O'Reilly, Ó Súilleabháin, and Paffenholz, “Reimagining Peacemaking: Women's Roles in Peace Processes.”


63. Ibid., 36.


65. The long term impacts on success of processes through women's inclusion and on the ‘how’ of inclusion, is perhaps the greater deficit that needs to be addressed, and one that would have significant outcomes. One area where all actors - mediators, civil society, experts - would benefit from increased capacity building is on operationalizing gender equal outcomes within all technical areas of peace talks. Research shows that the generic normative training or a purely normative approach is limited in impact and in fact owing to existing attitudes can in fact entrench resistance amongst gatekeepers. Rather, a more operational approach of engaging on and seeking entry points through the specific technical discussions may yield more impacts. For example, research on power sharing has revealed that while women’s organizations and gender equality advocates have been wary of engaging in discussions on power sharing, that in fact securing language in these agreements has a considerable impact on quotas for women’s political participation post-agreement. If actors are to intervene effectively to shape the equality outcome of a peace process, they must understand the technical elements of power sharing and how these can be used as entry points to further women’s rights.